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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN MICHAEL KRYGER and WILLIAM FREDERICK STEWART,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
Sitaroe Prlison,

OaseNo.

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Appellants, John Miichael Kryger and William
Frederick stewart, were denied a petilfJion for iwrit of
habeas corpus before the Thrird J udicia1 District Courtt,
in and for Salt Lake County, The Honor.aJble IJeonard W.
Elton, Presid1ing.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
John Michael Kryger and WiHiam Frederick Sltewart
pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery on the lOlth day of
June, 1968, in tJhe Third Judi.dial D:i!stflicit Court, in 01nd for
Salt Lake County. On December 29, 1969, a petiltion for writ
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of habeas corpus was filed in tthe Th!ird J udiclial Disitrict
Court, in and for Salt Lake County. A response of the
Attorney Genera;l was duly £iled and hearing held on the
maJtter before the Honorable Leonard W. E 1~ton. On the
14th day of April, 1970, Judgie Elton entered an order denying the appel'lants' wr:i1t of habeas corpus.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of ithe District
Oourt should ibe affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
John Michael Kryger :and Wiilliam Frederick Stewart
were arrested on May 15, 1968 (T. 33, 47), and charged
with robbing one Thomw.s Edwin F1inch (T. 33, 47). Subsequeilltly on June 10, 1968, John Michael Kryger and William Freder:ick Stewart, with counsel, made an inteHigent
and vdluntary plea of guilty ito 1fue c11ime of rolbibery. (Arraignment and plea T. 1, 2, 3) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANTS' GUILTY PLEAS WERE VOLUNTARILY AND UNDERSTANDINGLY
MADE AND AS A RESULT WAIVE ALL DEFENSES OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE.
Counsel for appellanlts s:taJtes that peti1tioneris were
forced to plead gu~tlty. He puits great sltre.ss on the megalirty of the evidence obtained against Kryger and 8te1wart,
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and claims the guilty pleas were induced as a result of this
evidenc,e. Appellants speoifically complain th rut a oonfession, a knife, and a lineup (which appeHants claim were
illegally obtained or accompHshed), coupled with arresting
officers' faJilure to make a Miranda warning, voids the
guilty plea.
1

Before delvin;_:; into court law on these a:Tlegations, ,it
is important :to note two points. First, all so-called "illegail
ev,idence" as represented by appeHanrts is nothing more
than aHegations on their part. Becau•se ithe appellants
pleaded gui~ty, trial was never held, and thus oo judge or
jury ever determined if :the allegations made by Stewart
and Kryger were true. Second, the guilty pleas by Stewart
and Kryger were volun:tamly and understandaJbiy given.
The Judge told them the consequences of :their plea, and
counsel asked them if they had been coerced in any way
- both answered no. Then both appellants sttated they
were pleading gui lty solely because they were gurlty of the
crlime char~ed.
1

THE COURT: Which one is Stewart? Alright.
Mr. S1tewart and Mr. Kryger, the Court wants ito
inform you tha;t this is a felony and in the event
eilther of you \Should plead guilty thereto or be found
guility thereof you wilil be subjected to a posstble
1indeiterminate term in the Utah State Prison. Are
you aware of tha!t fact, Mr. Stewart?
MR. STEWART: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you aware of thrut facit, Mr.
Kryger?
MR. KRY GER: Yes, ,sir.
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THE COURT: Record may so show and, also,
you and each of you have at 'leas1t itwo days and not
more than ten days before eniteriing pleais to this
charge unless you desire to waive thaJt ltime and
enter pleais at this 1time.
MR. STEWART: I'd

li~e

to waive it.

THE COURT: Ailrighit. T'ime may be waived
on behalf of Defendant Stewart. And, you, Mr.
Kryger, would also like to 1wa;ive?
MR. KRYGER:

(Nods head.)

THE COURT: Alright. Time may be waived
on behalf of the Deferrdanlt Kryger.
MR. BOWN: Your Honor, prior ito the entry
of a plea may I have the convenience of the record?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. BOWN: Mr. Stewart and Mr. Kryger, I
understand at this time you aue about to 'enter a
pilea of guilty 'to the crime of robbery as charged
in the Information, which 'Was juslt read Ito you, is
tha!t correct?
MR. STEWART: Yes.
MR. KRYGER: Yes.
MR. BOWN: Now, in regard to this pl,ea, Mr.
Stewart and Mr. Kryger, has anyone from my
off1ice, from the Distrieit AitJtorney's office, the
County Attorney's offieie, the pal!ice deparitmenrt, :the
County Sheriff's department, the Court or anyone
given any promise or done anylthing Ito coerce you
into pleading guilty to this charge as you've just
heard read to you, Mr. Stewart, and Mr. Kryger?
Answer audibly, would you please?
MR. STEWART: No.
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MR. KRY GER: No.
MR. BOWN : Then I understand you're entering a plea of guilty solely because you are guilty of
the crime ,as charged here, is that right?
MR. STEWART: Yes.
MR. KRYGER: Yes.
(Arraignment and Plea T. 2, 3.)
The transcript in the haibeas oorpus proceeding also
seems to indicaite Kryger and Stewart knew 1they were
guilty and gave voluntary p 1leas.
Q.

And did you subsequently plead gui'lit;y?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Would you tell the Court whether this evidence, the identi.fication, the presence of the knife,
the orther things, the statement that you made, induced to any extent your plea?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Whart was your reason for pleading?

A. We jusrt thought we'd just get out there
and do our time because they S'aid it would be until
about December and we didn't wanJt to wait around
in the County jail for aboult eight monJths.
Q. Did you bel1ieve 1there was no orther alliternative than to plead guii1lty in view of this eviidence?

A.

No, sir.

(T. 40.)
The above transcripts clearly indicate !that Stewart
and Kryger voluntarily and rintelligenrtly, with rthe advice
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of counsel, pleaded guilrty to rthe Cl'ime charged, especiially in
light of a recen:t T'enth Circuit decision:
"It is a fundamental basic right that an accused
be advised of the narture of charges against him and
consequences of p'lea of guilty; however, it is not
mandatory ,that judge ri tualisticaHy and personally
advise accused of these maitter·s; 'it is sufficiient that
,the accused be in fact ,aware of such regardless of
the source from where the information comes; the
accused can he pult on reail notice through hi s own
lawyer." Miller V. Crouse, 346 F. 2d 301 (loth Cir.
1965). Id. at 306. See a:l•so: William v. Cox, 350 F.
2d 849 (10th Cir. 1965).
1

1

1

Because petitioniers Stewart and Kryger pleaded gllii'lty
to ithe crime charged, they have no basis to bring 1the present habeas corpus. Irt is a welll known rule of law, supported
to decisions of ithe Urnted Stakes Supreme Court, tilmt a;ll
non-jurisd'ic1Jiona:l defects are waived on a plea of guilty.
Kercheval V. United States, 274 U. S. 220 (1926). There:fore, peltJitioners' c'laims of iNegal evidence, forced confession, which in turn forced the guHty plea, iHegal Wineup,
and incomplete Miranda warning which are non-jurisdicrtiona;l claims were waived when they pleaded .guiiity.
1

1

In a United Sita!tes Supreme Court cas'e dealing wilth
Rule II of the Federa;l Rules of Crriminal Procedure, the
majority opinion sltates the following:
"A defendant who entem such a plea (guilty)
simultaneously wailves several consrtirtulffi:ona!l rights,
including his piiivi'lege agari.nslt oompusory self-incriminaitlion, h!is right tto :trial by jury, and his right
to confront hlis accusers. For this wa:iver to be valid
under rthe due process clause, iit must be 'an inten-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tri.onal relinquishment or abandonment of a known
iighrt or privi lege.'" McCarthy v. United States,
394 U. S. 459 ( 1969) . Id. at 465.
1

This same prinoiple was alsq held in Boykin v. Alabama,
395 u. s. 238 (1969).
"Severa;} federal constitutional r,ighJts are involved in a waiver thaJt takes place when a plea o.f
guil.Jty is entered in a sitate criminal trial. First, is
the pr,ivilege against compulsory self-incrimination
guaranlteed by the Fifth Amendment and appilicable
to the s tate by reason of the fourteenth. Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. Second i s the right to trfal by
a jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 14'5. Third
is the right to confront one's accusers. Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400." Id. at 243.
1

1

This year lthe Supreme Coum has handed down a decision which exp,ands the McCarthy, and Boykin decisions,
supra. In McMann v. Richardson, ______ U. S. ______ , 90 S. Ot.
1441 (1970)' lthe coum held:

"Because guilty plea is a waiver of trial and,

unless applioruble law 01t'hel'!Wlise provides, a waiver

of right to consent admissibility of any evidence
state might have offered against defendant, guilty

plea must be an fo.rtelligenit ract done with sufficient
awareness of rellevalllt circumstances and 1,ikely consequences." Id. at 1446. (Emphasis added.)
In UtaJh there ·is no other appUcablie law and of courise, the
Supreme Coulit decision ·is binding - a gud.lty plea waives
right to consent to 'admissibHiity of ev·idence by defendant.
This dec'istion specifically prohibits Kryger and Stewart
from alleging rthe evidence was 1inegaHy seized, !through
their guilty pleas they waived consent of prohiib'.iting evi1

1

dence 1in court.
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McMann v. Richardson, supra, ailso held thart a guilty
plea resul~ing from a confession is not grounds to allege
a coerced or induced plea. (In the present situation petJitioners claim the confessfon of Kry.ger could not be used
against Srtewart and that the confession was coerced.)
"New York defendants, who with !the advice of
counsel had entered plews of gui!lty, were not entitled ito hearing on hwbeas corpus petitioners alleging tha!t ·their confessions had been coerced and thalt
the improperly procured confessions induced their
guilty please where ithere was no further showing."
Id. at 1449.
1

See also Parker v. North Carolina, ______ U. 8. ______ , 90
S. Ct. 1458 (1970); and Brady v. United States, ______ U.S.
______ , 90 iS. Ct. 1463 ( 1970) .
The other federal courts including '1Jhe T,enth Circuit
adhere to the same principle. N Olte the folllowing 'language
taken from Benton v. United States, 352 F. 2d 59 (loth
Oir. 1965) wherein the defendant alleged that there was
an i'1legal search and seizure, coercion, and iJllegal confes1

sions.
"In view of the allegwtion of fiact made by appeHantt on this appeal with respect 'to the search
and seizure, 1the coercion, and the confession issues,
we agree with appelilee that appellant's plea of
guHty prevents any consideration thereof on this
point." Id. at 60.
1

In another T enlbh Circuit case, Lattin v. Cox, 355 F.
2d 397 (10th Cir. 1966), rbhe appellant (appeal from denirail
.of his habews corpus pefiition) presented several 1issues at
1
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the pretrial hearing; thaJt no warrant was issued for appellant's arrest; his plea of gui:lty was not vuluntary; that
statement made to police orfficers was without his knowledge and hence illegal; that property was taken through
an illegal search and seizure; and finally, he compla;ins of
cruel and unusua1l punishment and delay in being brought
before a justice of the peace. The Tenth Circuit then held:
"Afrter a caref u l consideration of the entire
r·ecord before us, we must conclude that the pleas of
guHty entered by Lattin in the •.srtaite court to the
charges of involuntary mans~aughter and rape were
voluntary and understandingly made and were not
induced by any promises or threats. Such pleas of
gui11ty w1aived all nonjurisd:ictional defects in proceedings had prfor thereto." Id. at 400.
1

State court precedence is also in accord. The .Supreme
Court of Arizona in State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 21 5, 427
P. 2d 533 (1967) staJtes the fo1Howing:
1

"We f1ind no va-lid:ity in this argument for none
of the matters comp1la:ined of by defiendanlt attacks
any jurisdictional defect in the proceedings and iJt
itS ·a weH •esfal:JJ.:ished rule of law ithat when a defendanlt volunltarily and knowingly pleads guii:ltty at
his trial such consitiltutes a w:aJiver of nonjurisdictional defenses, defects and irregularities." Id. 3Jt
534.
1

From these cases, it is clear that a guilty pfoa similar
to Kryger and Stewarts', which are volu:nJtarily and knOiwingly given, walive aJll nonjurisdicitiional defenses, defects or
irregularities.
AppeUan:ts try to distinguish rthe M cM ann deoision
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on two counts. First, he states that the Supreme Court
decision 'in M cMann, supra, is a minoriJty view and goes
agaiinst reason. A Supreme Court deciision i1s nort consli.dered
a minority vi,ew, on the contrary iit is considered lthe supreme law of the land! Most of appellanits' b11ief is based
on Supreme Court decisfons which were so oa:Hed "minority dec'isions". Where appl1icable, Supreme Court decisions
are the final and au:bhoriltarl:Jive 'law of America.
1

i

Appellants al so try to amtack or distinguish McMann
on the basis of incompetent counsel. McMann held "plea
of guilty in state court is not subject rto collaterail attack
in federal court on ground thart it was motivated by a coerced confession unless defendants were 'incompetently advised by their attorney." Id. a:t 1948. Appellants assert
original counsel was incompetent and therefore McMann
does not apply. Counsel for appellants was and is a :wellknown and respected lawyer in the community. He was :
with appellants when they pleaded guilty and surely advised
appellants as 1Jo whart he thought was best for them. Even
the Supreme Court realizes how hard it is to advise your
client whether or not to plead guilty.
1

"But because of inherent uncertainty in guilty
plea advice . . . . " McMann v. Richardson, ______ U.
S. ______ , 90 S. Ct. 1441. Id. at 1449.
"Considerations like these [whether or not to
plead guilty] frequently present imponderable que3tions for which there are no certain ans·wers; judgments may be made which in the light of later
events seem improvident, although they were perf ectly sensible at the time." Brady v. lJnited States,
______ U. S. ______ , 90 S. Ct. 1-!63 ( 1970). Id. at 1473.
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In Syddall v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 437 P. 2d 194

(1968) , the court looked to the record 1to see if anything
suggested that the prisoner had been improperly induced
to enter his plea of guilty. Since nothing was shown, lbhe
court held itha;t he had been adequately represented by
counsel.
Arizona 1aHows a conte!lltJion of deprivaroion of adequate
counsel to be aeserted in habeas covpus proceedings only
in extreme cases:
"If appellanlt sets f orith no facts which indlicaite
the appointed attorney's performance w~ so suibs'tlandard as to render rthe tri al a f:arce or sham, ithe
petition is properly den~ed." Baron v. State, 7 Ariz.
App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975 (1968). Id. at 977.
1

Consiiderung rthe transcr~pit, original counsel's reputation, and a;H circumstances involved, it ;is difficult to understand why or when counsel was inadequate, raither, respondent collltends that originaJl counsel for petilbioners was
completely oompetenlt and advised h:i!s clients to rthe best
of Ms :abrnty.
"When defendanlt weighs his SltaJte courit remedies and aidmi!ts his gui1t, he does so under the law
then existing and assumes risk of ordinary error

in either his or his attorney's assessment of law and
facts, and ailltlhouglh he might have pleaded differently ha:d 1aJter decided cases ithen been the i,aw, he
is bound by his plea, and his conviction will not be
set aside unless he can allege and prove serious
derelicltions on part of counsel sufflicienrt to show
thrut his plea was no:t a knowing and initeUigenlt art."
McMann v. Richardson, supra. (Emphasis added.)
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CONCLUSION
The respondent respeetful'ly submilts lthart the haJbeas
oorpus petition shouild be deil!ied. Peilitioners Stewart and
Kryger entered an inteWigent and voluntary guilty plea,
and based on cases cirted, they have no rigihlt fo allege their
oonsrtnitutional rights were viol,ated. Respondent prays that
1the lower court order denyiing the pettiti:on for hialbeas corpus be affirmed.
Respectfully submiltted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
AitJtorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chiief Assistant Arttorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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